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Brainy Africans to Fortress Europe: 
For Money or Colonial Vestiges? 
 
Economic reasons along with cultural affinities and the existence of networks have been the 
main determinants explaining migration flows between home and host countries. This paper 
reconsiders these approaches combined with the gravity model and empirically tests the 
hypothesis that ex-colonial links can still play an important role in the emigration decision. We 
employ a general linear mixed model, and apply it to the case of skilled, educated and 
talented Africans, who migrate to Fortress Europe over the period of 1990 to 2001. While we 
find some differences in the exodus of skilled Africans by sub-regions, the magnitude of the 
colonial vestige in Africa is a significant determinant of emigration flows. Overall, Portugal is 
preferred to the UK which is preferred more than Belgium, Germany and Italy. Brainy 
Africans are, however, indifferent between the UK, France and Spain as a destination 
country. Established immigrant networks and higher standards of living with job opportunities 
in the host country are also very important drivers of the emigration of brainy Africans to the 
European ex-colonial powers. 
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1.  Introduction 
The imbroglio surrounding the migration debate in general and especially in Europe is far from 
being resolved. Migration scholars, pundits and policymakers alike are deeply divided over the 
responsibilities and the best concepts for analyzing or solving the issue of international 
migration. At the same time, all immigrant countries advocate the need for skilled labor and try 
to liberate entry hurdles for brainy immigrants. This is, in particular, the latest trend in fortress 
Europe. In Germany, for example, immigrants with a university degree can enter and work 
freely, and foreign students who finish their degree in Germany can stay if they find 
employment. France has recently adopted the concepts “immigration de remplacement” 
(demographic replacement migration), “immigration choisie” (selective immigration according 
to criteria), and “immigration concertée” (bilateral temporary guestworker programs) (Chojnicki 
et al., 2005; Banegas et al., 2007). 
  Human capital is a critical input in the economic production function and skilled workers 
are very well compensated. Obviously, those who gain from this type of migration are the 
immigrants themselves and the host countries (brain gain). But where do the brainy skilled 
immigrants come from and what happens to the countries they leave behind? The answer is 
related to the term brain drain, coined by the British Royal Society in the 1950s. It refers to the 
permanent and non-replenished exodus of scientists, researchers and other highly skilled workers 
from developing countries to the USA and Canada. In its severe narrow form, brain drain 
deprives the often poor countries of origin of their most valued capital, that of educated, creative, 
talented and healthy individuals for whom the country of origin has paid to educate and provide. 
Naturally, the source country suffers a deceleration of economic development
1. 
                                                 
1 Some argue, however, that the remittances these highly skilled individuals send back can significantly contribute 
to economic development; that some brain drain is beneficial as it alleviates unemployment pressures; and that 
return migration of these skilled workers with extra foreign training can be more advantageous. Moreover, others 
advance the idea that the emigration of highly skilled individuals may help remaining innovators access valuable   3
The fiscal impact notwithstanding, the loss for the developing countries and the people 
left behind can also come in different forms and can be hard to measure. One example is the 
exodus of students who acculturate abroad and hardly ever return. In the late 1970s, about 
105,000 Sub-Sahara African students were studying in only six Western European countries 
(Russell et al., 1990). Another example is that many of these educated and skilled individuals 
could have an influence in the decision-making process of the government, could voice a healthy 
opposition, could also shape new ideas and give hope. In this case, the source country may be 
left politically vulnerable, victim of coup d’états, and various other ethnic conflicts.   
  Hatton and Williamson (2002) argue that emigration from Africa will continue and match 
the early 1900s emigration of Europeans to the New World. Restricting African migration may 
be partially successful, but has unpleasant side effects such as social problems at home, a rising 
share of illegals, and increasing diplomatic problems between Africa and Europe.  
Africa is a continent that could easily fit in the brain drain, migration and development 
literature. For the last couple of decades, about 20,000 Africans emigrate to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries each year (Adepoju, 2008). Africa 
has the longest colonial experience than any other continent, and shares a history with Europe for 
many centuries. While the colonialism era officially ended in the 1960s, Europe still constitutes 
the first main destination for African migrants. In 2000, more than 60% of African migrants live 
in Europe, while only 31% live in North America (Lessault and Beauchemin, 2009). Defoort and 
Docquier (2007) find that if France conducts a selective migration policy that would induce a 
significant increase in the brain drain from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the OECD 
countries and, at a lower extent, South Asia.  
                                                                                                                                                             
knowledge accumulated abroad, the so called ‘brain bank’ (Agrawal et al., 2008). Beneficial brain drain is even 
more likely when models account for consumer consumption. That is, the sending country’s consumers benefit more 
by knowledge produced abroad by their countrymen than at home if the skilled emigrants had stayed. The benefit is 
greater the weak or more endogenized intellectual property rights are in the sending country (Kuhn and McAusland, 
2006).   4
  African migration to Europe may not strictly follow the neoclassical economic model of 
migrating that is based on wage differentials. Certainly, economic migrants typically seek better 
living conditions and want to improve their lives; logic would dictate that countries with the 
highest living standards would attract a disproportional number of migrants. However, the 
Scandinavian countries that offer the highest standards of living and the best material conditions 
in the world, do not receive a high number of African immigrants (Hooghe et al., 2008). Using 
OECD and Eurostat data on the migrant inflow into European countries between 1980 and 2004, 
Hooghe et al. (2008) find that while migration flows react mainly to labor markets, cultural and 
colonial ties are equally important.
2 Docquier et al. (2007) also show that, inter alia, brain drain 
from all developing countries is strong where colonial links exist. Interestingly, while Beine et 
al. (2008) confirm that colonial ties are positive and significant for the exodus of skilled 
individuals from developing countries to all OECD countries, they do not find colonial ties to 
matter for the exodus of all individuals.  
While African brain drain is of paramount importance for all economic actors and for the 
global economy and society, and while over the years there have been many studies on the 
subject mostly by political scientists very few studies have analyzed empirically African brain 
drain to the respective ex-colonial powers. The main reason is the non existence of adequate data 
or the existence of very fragmentary data. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical 
work in the economic literature that has attempted to explain bilaterally why highly skilled 
Africans leave their countries of origin to go to fortress Europe. While it is obvious and intuitive, 
and most experts acknowledge that there exists a long-term historic relation between the two 
continents, very few studies have examined the force of colonialism as a determinant of African 
migration to Europe.  
                                                 
2 Their study does not explicitly analyze the direct (bilateral) migration flows from a former colony to its ex-colonial 
power. They instead use a broad comparative dataset of migration patterns that covers 21 European countries over 
the period of observation.   5
The present paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on brain drain from 
developing nations by revisiting the different approaches adopted so far in the literature, and 
explicitly applying to the case of the fifty three states in the African Continent. Using recently 
available and reliable data on Africa’s outflows into OECD countries, our main focus is the role 
of colonial linkages. While we test other theories and models, such as the gravity model, the 
neoclassical model, and the networks theory, we conjecture that the magnitude of the colonial 
vestige in that continent outweighs any other factors explaining the African brain drain. 
The rest of the paper is set as follows. In section 2, we proceed with a brief literature 
review on the recent research contributions on brain drain from developing countries and we 
provide an overview of post-colonialism facts. In section 3, we describe our model and the data 
being used for this study. The empirical evidence is presented in section 4, and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Review of Migration Theories, Literature and Colonization 
2.1.  Theories of International Migration Movements 
Overall, even though there is no consensus among researchers on the determinants of 
international migration, different theories attempt to address and explain the drivers of migration. 
There are tangible and intangible drivers. Migration is also self-selective. Following Massey 
(1999), we provide an overview of the most prominent theories of migration in the social 
sciences. Neoclassical economic theories, like the famous “push-pull framework,” have certainly 
dominated the literature over the last few decades; they have placed the labor markets in the 
heart of the movement. In 1970, the Harris-Todaro macro-model explained migration through 
geographic differences in the demand and supply of labor. As people leave areas of abundant 
labor and scarce capital to move to places of scarce labor and high wages to reap high returns,   6
wages equalize and the movement stops. Similarly, the micro-model of migration assumes a 
rational individual who maximizes utility and moves abroad because there are economic 
disparities (wages and jobs). As people move, the labor markets of the sending and receiving 
countries reach some equilibrium and migration subsides. Among several studies confirming 
migration due to wage differentials, Hatton and Williamson (2003) find that real wage gaps 
between Europe and the new world were one of the main forces of European emigration in the 
late nineteenth century.
3  
Every move entails monetary and psychic costs. When costs are much lower than the 
benefits then migration takes place; this is a cost-benefit analysis. The human capital model says 
that workers embody a set of skills that they can “rent” to employers. Workers invest in 
education, training, experience and health that make them more productive
4 and thus they 
command higher wages. Migration is also investment in human capital that increases 
productivity (Sjaastad, 1962). Human capital theory predicts that skilled and talented workers, 
the young and the brightest will move first and will remain highly internationally mobile. 
Undoubtedly, they move from areas of relatively low earnings to areas of high earnings. 
Nonetheless, the push-pull framework has been subject to critiques. The main argument against 
this approach is that the concepts were developed in an industrial era, and as such they no longer 
offer the best perspective on migration in a post-industrial, globalizing world (Hooghe et al., 
2008; Massey et al., 1998).  
The second strand of theory on international migration is the World System Theory. It 
centers upon the idea that there are dominant wealthy countries (core capitalist nations) and poor 
dependent countries (peripheral or semi-peripheral) and that global capitalism perpetuates these 
                                                 
3 Another force of emigration was demographic booms in the low-wage European sending regions.  
4 With regards to the movement and productivity of world class workers, Hunter et al. (2009) – using the world’s 
most-cited physicist’s case – find that almost half of them live outside their country of birth and they move 
systematically in countries with large R&D spending. They also find that elite movers, on average, are not much 
productive than elite stayers. There is no evidence on whether migration improves scientists’ productivity.       7
inequalities and reinforces a stratified economic order. Wage differentials are not important here. 
Migration in this theory is a structural consequence of the expansion of markets within a global 
political hierarchy, and migration patterns reflect center/periphery to the center, in terms of 
linguistic dominance or cultural hegemony (Massey, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2008). In other words, 
migrant flows are triggered when capitalist economic relations enter non- or pre-capitalist 
societies. There are various types of links between core capitalist countries and countries in the 
periphery such as enduring ideological, intellectual and cultural ties. The vestiges of colonization 
in the organization of the education system in former colonies, and specifically the dominance of 
European concepts in universities’ structure of knowledge, is one of the factors contributing to 
the magnetism of the former colonies to their former colonial powers (Hooghe et al., 2008; 
Massey et al., 1998). Even simple tourists visiting Africa could also ignite the desire to go 
abroad to the European country. 
The presence of armed forces in the colonies or in the peripheries in general also triggers 
emigration from the poor countries to the core countries. Military bases can easily expose the 
natives to the foreigners’ way of living, their wealth, customs, culture, etc. Oftentimes military 
bases are the cause of intermarriages and further emigration from the home country. Specifically 
for Africa and its former European colonizers, we find that even after decades of decolonization, 
many European countries have kept some military bases in Africa for “just in case.” France, for 
instance, has until now military bases along the Atlantic in most of its former colonies. We find 
the 23
rd and 43
rd BIMA (Bataillon d’Infanterie de Marine) in Senegal and Côte d’ Ivoire 
respectively, and other bases in Gabon, Chad, and Djibouti. BIMA is ready to intervene
5 when 
political pressures mount or a coup occurs.  
 
                                                 
5 In the meantime, however, with the increasing remonstration from some African leaders, France is trying to 
redefine its military bases in the continent.   8
Other powerful links are, for example, the established Airfare system (by the former 
colonial powers). Direct flights from the colony to the colonial power but not to other colonial 
powers may substantially influence the migration patterns of individuals in those former 
colonies. In a way, the ex-colonial powers make it very difficult for Africans to fly directly to 
their city of choice in Europe. Instead, they have to go to the former colony’s country first.  
Beside the historical causes, e.g. occupation, colonization, this kind of structural 
unbalance may also be brought up by means of mass communication, which vehicles 
information on Western lifestyle and shapes consumption expectations in the culturally 
peripheral societies (Hooghe et al., 2008). In this regard, Massey (1999) points out that the 
penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies is today 
made possible by neocolonial governments and multinational firms that perpetuate the power of 
national elites who either participate in the world economy as capitalists themselves or offer their 
nation’s resources to global firms on acceptable terms. In the past, however, this market 
penetration was assisted by colonial regimes that administered poor regions, like in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, for the benefit of economic interests in colonizing societies. 
The third theory explaining emigration is the social capital theory emphasizing the 
central role of social networks that include relatives. It postulates that migrants are attracted by 
the fact that other migrants from the same ethnic group or country have already settled in the 
host country, which consequently allows for the occurrence of networks of recruitment (Hooghe 
et al., 2008; Massey et al., 1998). Migrant networks come in the form of kinship, friendship, 
shared country of origin, etc. Networks, basically, lower the costs and increase the returns of 
migration. While networks have been acknowledged in the literature as powerful determinants of 
migration, it is not a priori certain that they also work for the skilled and educated group of 
migrants we are studying. It is possible that skilled migrants do not need networks because they   9
are educated and can find their own way. Note that while the previous two approaches claim to 
identify what essentially attract migrants to their destination countries, the networks approach 
explains emigration flows as well as it explains return and repeat migration. Notably, once 
migration has been initiated it can persist and be self-sustained due to cumulative causation 
(Massey et al., 1998).  
  The New Economics of migration is another theory that considers the role of a variety of 
markets not just labor markets. The basic idea here is that migration is a household decision to 
minimize and overcome constraints of the family’s consumption or production. In developing 
countries, insurance, futures, capital or consumer credit markets either do not exist or they fail 
soon after they open. The goal of the household is then to diversify risks and improve its income 
in absolute and relative terms. While wage differentials are not necessary, economic 
development in the home country may intensify emigration pressures. For example, it may 
change where people are in the income distribution and relative income becomes an important 
push of migration.  
  The last migration theory is the segmented labor markets. It focuses on the bifurcated 
structure of the labor markets in two tiers and the irreversible sorting of workers by employers. 
Accordingly, immigrants are tied to the lower tiers of the markets and have no chance to escape 
them. Migration here is demand driven from the host country; it could be from the native 
employers or from immigrants who arrived earlier and need more co-ethnics to support the 
enclave. Examples of this type of migration are the guestworker schemes. Host countries 
demand mostly lower skilled immigrants who accept low rank jobs for a low wage and help the 
host country to maintain an occupational hierarchy. Immigrants are attracted to these schemes 
because they pay more than what they would earn in the home country and because they think 
that it is temporary.    10
  A popular model in the literature of international trade is the gravity model. It is used to 
analyze the flow of bilateral trade. It is based on the economic sizes of the two trading partners 
(often using GDP measurements) and the distance between them. The model states that the 
amount of bilateral trade is an increasing function of the national incomes of the trading partners; 
it is positively affected by the presence of a common language and a common border; and it is a 
decreasing function of the distance between them. This model often very successful in predicting 
the flow of goods and services could also be used in migration to describe and predict the 
movement of individuals. In fact, the gravity model of migration is indeed used in urban 
geography. The idea is that – if we consider two cities – as the size or population of one or both 
of the cities increases, the movement of people will also increase between them, and the longer 
the distance between the two cities is, the lower the movement between them will be. This is 
often called “distance decay.” 
To test these theories, empirical scientists need good data. Lack of data in some countries 
or incomplete data in others have prevented migration researchers to adequately study the issue 
of brain drain. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) were the first to estimate the magnitude of the 
brain drain from developing countries to OECD countries. They find substantial brain drain from 
the Caribbean, Central America, and some African and Asian countries. Only recently Docquier 
et al., (2007) produced and made available to the community a new dataset that allows research 
on emigration flows and in particular, on brain drain. They also provide a good study on brain 
drain from developing countries to OECD countries. Based on their aggregate international data 
they estimate skilled workers emigration rates for about 190 countries in 2000 and 170 countries 
in 1990, including both developed and developing countries. They show that brain drain is strong 
in small countries that are close to major OECD regions and in countries with colonial links, and 
that brain drain increases with political instability and the degree of fractionalization in the home   11
country (especially in Sub-Sahara Africa) and decreases with natives’ human capital. Unlike 
geographic proximity, however, linguistic proximity is seldom significant for brain drain. They 
also evaluate the changes in brain drain intensity from 1990 to 2000 and show that Western 
Africa, Eastern Africa and Central America experienced a substantial outflow of their high 
skilled population during the past decade. 
Looking at annual panel data on net migration between 1977 and 1995, Hatton and 
Williamson (2003) use the European emigration history as a paradigm to project emigration 
from Africa in the future. They provide evidence that not only is there dramatic pressure to 
emigrate from Africa, but that African emigration is driven by the exact same forces observed in 
late nineteenth century Europe. Acknowledging that most of African emigration takes place 
within the continent, they conclude that African emigration will intensify with increasing 
demand to migrate to the high-wage labor markets of the developed world.  
Clemens and Pettersson (2008) concentrate on the brain drain from health professionals – 
doctors and nurses out of Africa. They find that about one fifth of African-born physicians in the 
world, and about one tenth of African-born professional nurses were working overseas in a 
developed country in the year 2000. The fraction of health professionals abroad varies 
enormously across African countries, from 1% in Egypt for nurses to 81% in Liberia and from 
5% for physicians in Equatorial Guinea to 75% in Mozambique, according to the occupation and 
country. They also find that the emigration of health professionals does not really differ from the 
emigration of other educated workers such as engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs, etc. 
 
2.2.  Colonialism and its Long-lasting Impact on Migration 
The colonization era of European nations to most African countries officially ended around and 
during the 1960s. By the end of the colonial rule, tens of thousands of people from Africa   12
migrated to Europe. The majority of them were colonial repatriates (who at the time were the 
main source of skilled and educated personnel),
6 but many native Africans also migrated to the 
motherlands. This was either due to natives seeking to ameliorate their life, the signing of 
agreements, or to civil wars and political repression. Decolonization also removed many military 
people, leaving the ex-colonies very vulnerable. The behavior of the former colonial powers vis-
à-vis their colonies varies. While Belgium exercised a very restrictive stance towards ex-colonial 
immigrants, France experienced a different pattern. After the Algerian independence in 1962, 
about one million of French-Algerians moved to France, of whom there were 350,000 Algerians 
or “French Muslims.” Many Tunisians, Moroccans, and West-Africans also moved to France. In 
spite of the fact that France tried to restrict Algerian migration, it continued (Haas, 2007). In 
1982, for example, Algeria was the leading group (in terms of immigrant stock) in France 
(Constant, 2005). By the mid 1960s immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa marked its debut to 
France. This mass migration created a serious shortage of housing in France (Constant, 2005).  
In the 1970s we observe a significant migration of people from Angola, Mozambique,
7 
and Cape Verde to Portugal, seriously affecting many sectors of their economy. With the 
exception of France that kept some skilled expatriates in Côte d’ Ivoire and Gabon,
8 skilled 
personnel to sub-Saharan Africa came from aid agencies of industrialized countries. Germany 
was not a preferred destination from the former colonies, but Germany’s colonial rule ended in 
the early 1900s. During the post-colonization years, the German government actually sought 
guestworkers mostly from East and South Europe. Also France, Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands formally signed guestworker agreements with Morocco and Tunisia.  
                                                 
6 The departure of Europeans from Zaire, where over 80% of the commercialized production was controlled by 
them, had a detrimental effect on agriculture (Russell et al., 1990).  
7 Mozambique’s port and railway sectors lost about 8,000 skilled and semi-skilled workers to Portugal; most of the 
plantation and factory owners, settler farmers, shopkeepers, government administrators, and professionals also 
immigrated to Portugal (Russell et al., 1990). 
8 France has also kept military bases in many of its ex-colonies along the Atlantic. French military readiness is 
executed by its 43
rd BIMA.    13
The African brain drain to developed countries, with Western Europe being the main 
destination, has substantially increased over the last thirty years (Kohnert, 2007; Economic 
Commission for Africa or ECA, 2006). Between 33% and 55% of Africans with higher 
education left Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda and Tanzania in search for a better life and employment in OECD countries; about 
20,000 Nigerian and 12,000 South African doctors migrated overseas (Kohnert 2007). 
The human capital lost on the continent is mostly pronounced in the employment sector 
for highly qualified personnel. For example, statistics on 25 year olds and above as a percentage 
of the local work force show that African migration to OECD countries between 1990 and 2000 
is as follows: from Western Africa it is 20.7 and 26.7% respectively; from Eastern Africa 15.5 
and 18.6% respectively; from Central Africa it is 9.8 and 13.3% respectively; from Northern 
Africa it is 6.9 and 6.2% respectively; from Southern Africa it is 6.9 and 5.3% respectively (c.f. 
Kohnert, 2007; ECA, 2006; Docquier and Marfouk, 2004). 
The outflow of highly skilled Africans also constitutes a heavy financial burden to their 
respective native countries. UNCTAD estimates that the loss of an individual who has been 
educated in Africa costs the sending country on average USD 184,000 in terms of funds invested 
in that individual’s education and training. Other detrimental effects include delaying the 
building up of an African middle class, the development of structures of the African civil 
society, which may consequently exert a negative impact on the political and economic stability 
of the countries of origin (Kohnert, 2007).  
  To stave off the outflow of skilled and educated individuals in the 1980s, many Sub-
Sahara African countries practiced regulatory or restrictive policies (such as passport regulation 
and exit permits, and remittances requirements); delinking policies (such as employing nationals 
rather than expatriates); and incentive policies (such as providing attractive employment   14
conditions) (Russell et al., 1990). Still rancor was present in both continents. At the same time 
geopolitical instability was also increasing. In the 1990s and beyond, some ex-colonial powers 
provided large amounts of capital in retribution (i.e. Germany to Namibia) and others signed 
bilateral treaties of migration (i.e. France with Senegal). The United Kingdom not only increased 
aid to the continent, but also pressured the G8 to write off debt from Africa and to devise a plan 
to take Africa out of its economic development quagmire. The United Nations also helped in 
capacity building.    
The African brain drain, to the best of our knowledge, is an omission in the economics 
literature. It has been, however, widely debated in other social sciences (political science and 
sociology). For example, El-Khawas (2004) underlines the role of colonial ties in African 
migration by suggesting that some Africans prefer to migrate to their former colonial powers 
because of their familiarity with the language and culture. One of the recurrent arguments 
outlined in the papers resorting from other social sciences is Europe’s responsibilities vis-à-vis 
the ever increasing number of African exodus to continental Europe. Kohnert (2007) argues that: 
 “The European Union and its member states share a heavy dual responsibility 
for the continuing migration pressure: first, because they fostered over decades 
corrupt and autocratic regimes like that of Eyadema’s Togo or successive 
Nigerian military dictatorships, with direct disregard to principles of ‘good 
governance.’ The aftermath of these regimes is still to be felt today, and 
constitutes one of the underlying factors for migration. Secondly, the EU 
contributed to Africa’s growing economic misery, due to the damaging effects of 
European selfish external trade policy” (p. 19).  
Further, Banegas et al. (2007) describe France’s foreign policy reforms towards Africa under the 
different regimes in the V
e République. According to them “everything has changed so that   15
nothing changes;” this somehow transcends the status quo attitude of France towards the African 
Continent.  
The feminization of African migration is also of increasing importance for both 
continents. In 2005, about 14.5 million women from Africa resided outside their country of 
origin compared to 9.5 million in 1965 (ECA, 2006; United Nations, 2006). 
 
3.  Model, Variables, and Data 
3.1.  Empirical Model and Variables Hypotheses 
To empirically study the determinants of the African brain drain to Europe, we use a simple OLS 
model, regressing the emigration flows of skilled African workers on various potential 
determinants of migration following the established literature. Denoting the origin country i and 
destination country j, at time t then the dependent variable (migrijt) shows the migration flows 
from i to j at time t; it is specified as a semilogarythmic function as follows:   
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The economics literature on international migration distinguishes many potential 
determinants of brain drain. On the basis of the different theoretical approaches outlined in 
Section 2, including the gravity model, we select a group of independent variables that can best 
explain the migration flows from Africa to former colonial powers in Europe. First, we include 
the population of the host country to control for the simple fact that large countries will attract a 
larger number of migrants than smaller countries. All the variables are listed and explained in 
Table 1. 
Other variables following the push-pull and gravity models are the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita in the host country. GDP is an indicator of the host country’s overall   16
economic performance and a widely used proxy for wealth. The variable GDP at purchasing 
power parity (PPP) per capita is taken from the World Development Indicator (WDI) 2006. In 
the equation, it enters in its log form. This is convenient because the coefficient is the elasticity. 
The actual distance between Africa and Europe in miles or kilometers or the distance 
between the given two countries in Africa and in Europe, may be an important determinant. 
However, it may not be as important as is the easiness to cover this distance in terms of time and 
money. We therefore, use direct airfare connections as a proxy for distance. Direct flights from 
the respective African country to the European country can best capture the importance of 
distance as a determinant of migration. We carefully constructed a dummy variable by using the 
air transportation route, to analyze if there are some established transportation structures which 
ab initio make African Migrants land in one country instead of another. This variable is one if 
there is a direct flight from the former ex-colony to the former ex-colonial power and nowhere 
else and zero otherwise. Naturally, direct flights should increase emigration flows to the 
respective ex-colonial power and away from other European countries.  
We include the PPP in the origin country, because it indicates the cost of living and 
living standards of the country; it takes into account the relative cost of living and the inflation 
rates of different countries. We use PPP numbers from the WDI 2006. We expect to find that the 
higher the PPP is the lower the emigration flows are. Government expenditures growth in the 
country of origin is another variable that captures wealth and ample labor market opportunities in 
that country. The higher the expenditures, the more jobs may be available and earnings will 
increase, deterring people from moving abroad. We created this variable from the WDI 2006.  
Another set of variables accounts for the World System or cultural approach. Here, we 
stress the colonial ties between African countries and their former colonial powers. We 
consequently create a dummy variable for whether the African country was colonized or not.   17
This variable captures several aspects of colonial influences and ties that exist even decades after 
decolonization. They could be in the form of having perfect information about the former 
colony’s country and labor markets, of lingering cultural and intellectual affinity, and of 
suffering lower psychic costs when migrating to that country. They could also indicate some 
formal agreements between the respective countries, like recognition of education degrees, 
guaranteed access to university, etc. The presence of armed forces by the former colonial powers 
definitely adds to the explanatory power of the colonial dummy.  
Besides having one dummy variable for colonization, we create nine different categorical 
variables to analyze the precise impact, influence and attraction of each former colonial power in 
the respective former African colony. Specifically, we created one dummy variable for African 
countries colonized by each of the following European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and those colonized by two colonial powers. The 
last dummy variable applies to the African countries that were a priori Independent (i.e. Liberia). 
As others have suggested, if we believe in the cultural explanation of emigration, then it is 
inevitable that the ex-colonial powers will still attract migrants from their ex-colonies (Hooghe 
et al., 2008).   
To have a more “pure” variable for colonialism, we do not include language affinity in it. 
In order to capture the importance of language affinity we created another dummy variable. This 
dummy variable takes the value one for the countries in Africa whose first official language is 
the same as the one of their former colonial powers. Language fluency of the ex-colonial power 
that is now the host country has been long found as a powerful determinant of the economic 
performance of immigrants (Chiswick, 2007). With this variable we want to test the hypothesis 
that Africans who are fluent in a European language due to the fact that they learn it officially at 
school will be more likely to go to that country than to another country with a different language.    18
The fourth set of independent variables is in line with the networks approach, which 
predicts that the presence of migrant communities in the host country or city facilitates and even 
perpetuates further immigration. In fact, in many European countries there are already immigrant 
enclaves that oftentimes even live in a parallel world to that of the natives. Potential migrants 
who know people in the destination country will be more likely to make the move than 
otherwise. Networks do not always need to be connected to the same family, village or country 
of origin. The power of networks comes also from the camaraderie that migrants have and the 
common plight they share in the host country as foreigners distinguished from natives. However, 
it is possible that network theory may not apply to the group of brainy migrants who may not 
need the network for help; skilled and talented migrants may rely on themselves, or connect with 
the natives in the host country for support. Lastly, while networks help immigrants, the network 
usually knows everything about everybody else. Perhaps some immigrants do not like to be 
exposed and “reported” back to the country of origin, especially if they come from a country 
with compromised civil liberties. Following previous studies, we include the stock of foreign 
population in the host country at each time period in our observation as a proxy for networks 
(Hooghe et al., 2008). 
Finally, we borrow a determinant of emigration from political science and political 
economy. Accordingly, people move because of civil and political rights such as freedom of 
speech, freedom of press, freedom from any kind of discrimination, etc. Long after the 
independence waves in African countries in the 1960s, a considerable political metamorphose 
dominated many African countries in the last decade of the 20
th century. Namely, it was the 
introduction of “political pluralism” (Quantin, n.d.). The political transition was sometimes 
accompanied by conflict and ending in violence. Onga’yo (2008) contends that “the life 
threatening political and economic conditions in Africa contribute enormously to the massive   19
exodus of both highly qualified and lowly educated people in Africa” (p. 8). In order to capture 
the role of the political situation in the emigration flows, we introduce a variable for freedom and 
liberty. We assume that individuals like to live in countries where civic liberties and individual 
rights are protected and apply to all. Accordingly, if the home country ranks high in freedom and 
liberty it will be less likely for its people to emigrate. We gather this variable from the Freedom 
House World Country Ratings 2009. Civil Liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with 
one representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the lowest. It is interesting that in our 
sample of all fifty three African countries no country scored one.  
In addition to the sensible internal political transition, many African countries were also 
experiencing external pressures or “political conditionality” imposed by some international 
actors, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Quantin, n.d.). For example, 
countries under Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were systematically obliged to apply 
and abide by these measures inter alia (Adepoju, 2008; Ekpo, 1992; Khan and Knight, 1985; 
Guitan, 1981). That is, they had to reduce the size of the public sector which in many countries is 
the leading source of jobs, adjust their currency, increase domestic interest rates, etc. We capture 
this effect of the SAPs on the African emigration by creating a dummy variable for countries 
under these external economic conditionalities. While in principle these programs should help, in 
fact they handicap most African economies and are a major cause of brain mobility. The failure 
of economic growth policies in most African countries is visible: low per capita income, severely 
limited access to fundamental needs regardless of multiple efforts to improve social welfare, 
high mortality rates, and deterioration of the terms of exchange. Through SAPs, the balance of 
payment crisis has led to high inflation and a trend towards decrease in real earnings (Dia, 2004). 
Consequently, most highly skilled workers do not think twice about leaving their home countries   20
to go abroad where they have brighter prospects and higher wages and can rely on a stable 
economic system.  
 
3.2.  Data 
For this study we employ various sources of data. Migration flows of brainy Africans to the 
designated European countries in our analysis come from the bilateral data on gendered 
assessment of the brain drain by Docquier et al. (2008).
9 They painstakingly compiled an 
aggregate
10 dataset to capture the bilateral emigration in the world by collecting census and 
registry data on the structure of immigration in all OECD countries. The dataset counts as 
migrants all working-age (25 and older) foreign-born individuals living in an OECD country. 
This is an aggregate dataset on the stock of emigrants from all developing countries to OECD 
countries by level of schooling. By comparing the number of migrants to that of natives in the 
home country in the same education group, they calculate the emigration rate by educational 
attainment for two decades: 1990 and 2000. The dataset devotes special attention to data 
homogeneity and comparability.  
  This dataset presents several comparative advantages. First, it provides estimates of 
bilateral emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment and gender for 196 OECD 
countries over the period of 1990-2000,
11 therefore covering the migration rate and stocks of all 
fifty three countries on the African continent to the OECD countries in the dataset. For our 
present study, we select the bilateral migration (stock) of the fifty three states in Africa to seven 
European countries, which were former colonizers on the continent. We also look at the total 
                                                 
9 This is the revisited version of Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 
10 Due to the lack of micro-data on African migration, we content ourselves by the aggregate data of Docquier et al. 
(2008). The dataset is downloadable from Docquier’s website.  
11 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep. of South), Luxemburg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and USA.   21
migration stock of Africans to the respective country selected for our purpose. For the fifty three 
sending countries to the seven destination countries over the two time periods (1990 and 2000), 
there were no missing observations, in theory yielding 742 (53 African countries x 7 European 
countries x 2 points in time) observations. Africans who have finished at least high-school are 
counted in our brain drain sample.   
According to Docquier et al. (2008), the construction of their dataset relies on three steps: 
collection of Census and register information on the structure of immigration in all OECD 
countries, sum up over source countries; which allows for evaluating the stock of immigrants 
from any given sending country to the OECD area by educational attainment, and finally, 
compare the educational structure of emigration to that of the population remaining at home; 
allowing the computation of emigration rates by educational attainment in 1990 and 2000. 
Calculating the brain drain as a proportion of the total educated labor force provides a better 
measure of the pressure imposed on the local labor market. The term emigration rate is thus used 
to refer to relative stock data and not to immigration flows. 
As mentioned previously, the variables capturing the economic and labor market 
theories, as well as the networks approach (i.e. the stock of foreign population in the host 
country) are from the WDI (2006) database. The independent variables used to address the 
World Systems theory related to the colonial past were taken from different sources. The total 
number of inhabitants of the former colonial powers and the population of the host country are 
from the WDI (2006) database. The dummy variable categorizing the former colonial power was 
generated by using the classification made by Gieler (2007) and the CIA Factbook, and also the 
CEPII geographical data; we use these three different sources to double check the colonial 
footprint in each country in Africa.    22
Furthermore, the variable for Civil Liberties is taken from the Freedom House Annual 
Freedom in the World Survey (2009). We also take into consideration the external political and 
economic ‘pressure’ (political conditionality) by generating a dummy variable to control for the 
African countries that were or have been under Structural Adjustment Programs. To categorize 
the binary variable for SAP’s we consider the list provided by Boughton (2001). The dummies 
for language commonalities structure are created based on the data from the CEPII geographical 
information dataset. Finally, the variable that captures the airfare system and network between 
Africa and Europe is created by using the actual route map of the major airlines from the 
respective ex-colonial powers operating in Africa. These route maps can be downloaded from 
their respective websites. For example, for France, we use the actual route map of Air-France, 
for the United Kingdom we use British Airways, for Germany we use Lufthansa, and so on. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Sample Characteristics 
In Tables 2a-c, we present some colonization related facts between Africa and Fortress Europe. 
Table 2a describes the European colonization of entire Africa and by regions (North Africa and 
Sub-Saharan Africa). Out of the fifty three countries in Africa, fifty one countries were colonized 
by former European powers. Among the former colonizers, France ranks first with twenty 
colonies, or about 38% of the entire European presence in Africa. In North Africa, France 
occupied four out of six of the countries in Maghreb. The United Kingdom, as a second 
headliner occupied 32% of the African continent with seventeen countries. The third biggest 
colonial ruler was Portugal with five  countries or 10% of Africa. The colonization was 
accompanied with its corollaries of cultural (here represented with the ex-colonizer official 
language) assimilation.    23
Table 2b portrays the language affinity to the ex-colonial power. Out of fifty three 
countries, thirty nine have adopted the language of their ex-colonial power as their first official 
language and still have it to this day. They represent about 74% on the continent. Language 
assimilation is mostly found in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. In fact, thirty eight countries 
among the forty seven in this region (81%), share the same official language as their ex-
colonizer. In twenty nine countries in the continent, the direct air transportation to access Europe 
is still provided by the national airlines of the former European colonizers. This presence of ex-
colonial powers national airlines in Africa is highly observed in the Sub-Saharan countries with 
twenty seven countries relying on the former colonizer’s airline compared to only two countries 
in the Northern part of the continent. France with Air France carries 51.72% of the direct flights 
from one major city in Africa to Paris Charles-De-Gaulle, making it therefore the biggest 
commercial carrier on the African continent. It is followed by the United Kingdom with British 
Airways (31.03%) and Belgium with Brussels Airlines (10.34%). Table 2c illustrates these 
statistics. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of some selected variables employed in the 
regression for 1990 and 2000 respectively. On average, 5,425 skilled Africans went to the seven 
European ex-colonial powers in 1990. A decade later, 7,910 skilled Africans left their countries 
to go to these European ex-colonial powers. This is an almost 50% increase. The percentages of 
the official languages in Africa and airfare systems between the two continents have not changed 
between 1990 and 2000. Naturally, the population in these seven European host countries we are 
considering has increased from 44.3 million to 45.6 million. The existing immigrant networks in 
these European countries have also grown from 1,588,675 in 1990 to 2,161,603 in 2000, an 
increase of 36%. Similarly, GDP in purchasing power parity per capita has increased from 17 
thousand in 1990 to 24 thousand in 2000.    24
Looking at the PPP in Africa – in US Dollars – we see a tremendous increase in the 
decade by 210%. Assuming PPP depicts some economic well being, it is possible that this 
whopping change deterred more Africans from going to Europe. The last two remarks about the 
situation in Africa concern the existence of civil liberties and SAPs. It is noteworthy that on 
average, the score of the variable for civil liberties was about 5 in 1990 and it was also 5 in 2000. 
It is disconcerting not only that Africa scored 5 in 1990 – indicating rather trampled civil 
liberties – but that it remained at this level of stifled freedom by the beginning of the new 
century. As for the SAPs, we notice no change between 19990 and 2000. As verified by other 
sources, 72% of Africa practices SAPs under the instructions of the global lenders.   
In Table 4, we present detailed summary statistics of the migration flows of brainy 
Africans in our sample from each country of origin in Africa to each of the seven European ex-
colonial powers over the period of 1990 – 2001. These raw statistics show that there are 
persistent links between Africa and fortress Europe, often related to colonization. For example, 
on average 486,500 Algerians went to France compared to only 75 Algerians who headed to 
Portugal.
12 Furthermore, 27,121 people from Mali went to France while only 76 moved to the 
United Kingdom. Note that among those emigrants from France’s ex-colonies, those from the 
Maghreb constitute the vast majority that moves to France compared to their counterparts from 
the Sub-Saharan region. The same pattern of colonial linked destination is also observed by the 
countries colonized by Portugal and the United Kingdom. For example, while 106,862 Kenyans 
went to the United Kingdom, only 442 moved to France. And while 2,627 highly skilled 
migrants from Mozambique went to Portugal no one moved to Germany. The absolute numbers 
of brainy African emigration from Algeria, Kenya, Mali and Mozambique to the selected 
European countries from 1990-2001 are presented in the appendix.  
                                                 
12 As a heuristic example of the flows over time, in Table A1 in the appendix we provide the exact numbers for 1990 
and 2000 respectively for Algeria, Kenya, Mali, and Mozambique. This Table shows that the direction of the flows 
has not changed over the decade, possibly due to colonization vestiges and language affinities.      25
4.2.  Robust OLS Results 
The results of the robust OLS estimation are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, we report 
the coefficient estimates of the potential factors determining migration in equation (1) for the 
entire continent as well as by region. The asterisks show the significance level of the coefficients 
associated with each explanatory variable and the robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. In this estimation exercise we use one dummy variable for colonial power. The 
reference group is countries that were not colonized. Overall, the variance inflation factor is 
below the tolerated value. It is interesting to look at the coefficients on the constant term. They 
show that while skilled Africans from the northern regions are more likely to move to Europe, 
skilled Africans from the entire continent are not. There may be some unobserved or cultural 
differences that play a role and this warrants the separate estimations by region.  
The estimates show that, overall, in Africa the colonial linkage is a very important 
determinant of the skilled African migration. In the model, brainy Africans are 72% more likely 
to move to their ex-colonial power country than those who are a priori from a not colonized or 
independent African country.  
In addition, the established international airfare system in Africa, explained by the 
presence of ex-power national airlines in the respective ex-colonies, is also a key factor driving 
the exodus of high skilled Africans to Europe. The airfare variable unveils well the so far non-
empirically investigated assertion made by Hooghe et al. (2008). They, indeed, state that 
“communication and transportation lines are still being structured according to the colonial 
heritage. For example, direct flights from Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo) are still 
controlled by French and Belgian airlines companies, rendering it more plausible that citizens of 
Congo will arrive in France or Belgium, rather than in Germany or the UK.” (p. 502).    26
To our surprise however, the colonization variable has a negative sign for the Sub-
Saharan region. Looking at the language assimilation variable the picture becomes more 
confusing. For example, for the entire continent, countries that have the same language as the 
European ex-colonizer are less likely to export migrants to that country. Yet for the Sub-Saharan 
region language assimilation is a very powerful determinant of emigration. Migrants from Sub-
Saharan Africa are overwhelmingly more likely (72.3%) to head to their former colonial power 
based on the sharing of a common official language. While strange at first sight, this result is not 
so surprising. As mentioned earlier, more than 80% of the Sub-Saharan countries share the same 
official language as their former colonial powers. This indicates that immigrants from those 
countries have been ‘assimilated’ through the language link, therefore, crowding out to some 
extent the colonial argument as a key reason for migration into a specific country. Notably, this 
is the case of France’s assimilation policy, whereby the French colonizers tried their best to 
convert “uneducated Africans” into citizens who understood the ideals of the French civilization 
(Jones, 2003).  
The empirical results further confirm that existing networks in the host country (with an 
elasticity between 0.4 and 0.5) are a key determinant of African brain drain. Networks remain an 
important positive determinant even when we split the sample by region; except that the 
coefficient for North Africa is not statistically significant, but still with the expected sign. This 
shows that brainy Africans value and rely on social and familial networks when they consider to 
move abroad. The estimates of GDP per capita in the host country, a pull factor and a gravity 
force, yield the expected sign. However, it seems to attract more skilled migrants from the 
northern part of the continent than from the other region. With an elasticity of approximately 0.4 
this reveals the importance of “money” and good living conditions in the migration decision of 
skilled North Africans to fortress Europe. Indeed, in the words of Hass (2007) North Africans   27
stand in an ancient tradition of circular migration where they intend to return to their country of 
origin after certain amount of money has been saved to buy some land, build a house, or start 
their own business. In sum, colonization and its correlates, along with networks and high GDP in 
the destination country are the only drivers that matter for the emigration of educated individuals 
in Africa.   
Looking at the sub-regions in Africa, we find a few differences. SAPs in Africa constitute 
an important push factor of highly skilled Africans to Europe, but only for the Northern 
countries. Brainy people from North Africa whose country was under SAP’s measures are 74% 
more likely to migrate to Europe. This confirms other scientists’ findings that structural 
adjustments are a major cause of brain mobility because of their negative impact on African 
economies (Dia, 2004). Namely, because of the enforcement of SAP policies, countries 
experienced a balance of payment crisis that led to high inflation and caused deterioration of real 
wages. While this deterioration applies to all natives, it is the highly skilled workers who would 
be more mobile and able to flee and thus they no longer resist the temptation to go abroad.  
For the North African countries, the variable government expenditures growth is 
significant and has the right sign, indicating that the more the government invests in its country, 
the fewer people go abroad. Government expenditures such as spending on research or 
investments in the infrastructure of the country are actions that encourage skilled individuals to 
stay in their country. Civil liberties also matter in the Northern African countries (at the 5% 
level). This shows that the fewer liberties a country has, the less likely people are to leave the 
country. This is plausible because in very restrictive countries of dictatorship it is very difficult 
for people to leave even if they want to. The gravity hypothesis that a host country of larger size 
will attract more immigrants is not confirmed for the entire continent or for the sub-regions.     28
In Table 6, we present the empirical results from the re-estimated equation (1) that now 
has eight separate colonial dummy variables; the reference ex-colonial power is the United 
Kingdom. In this exercise, the coefficients on the constant term show a big difference between 
North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa. If no other determinants are valid, we see that North 
Africans will still exit to go to the ex-colonial powers in Europe. Sub-Sahara Africans on the 
other hand, would rather stay put and not migrate.  
For the entire African continent, evidence reveals magnetism to Portugal; a brainy 
African from a country colonized by Portugal is 69% more likely to go to Portugal compared to 
someone originating from a country colonized by the United Kingdom. The colonial forces of 
Portugal are important also in the sub-sample of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is interesting that the ex-
colonial powers France and Spain are no different than the United Kingdom in attracting skilled 
immigrants through colonial ties when we look at the entire African continent. France, 
understandably, still exercises a big power on the emigration of highly skilled people from the 
Northern part of the continent. That is, Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, etc. are 74% more 
likely to move to France based on their colonial ties than elsewhere in Europe.  
Results on the rest of the colonial dummies show that migrants from all African countries 
colonized by Belgium, Germany, Italy, and dual ex-colonial powers are strongly less likely to 
move to those former colonial powers than to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom as the 
preferred destination also holds for African countries that were never colonized. This clearly 
shows the superior attraction of the United Kingdom for brainy Africans in 1990 and 2000. 
These results change slightly when we consider the Sub-Saharan region only. Now, while Spain 
and Germany are no different than the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Italy are less 
preferred as a destination country in Europe then the United Kingdom. Sub-Saharan Africans   29
colonized by dual ex-powers are more likely to go to one of these countries than to the United 
Kingdom and so are those who have remained independent.  
Similar to results in Table 5, the language variable is negative for the entire continent and 
positive for the Sub-Saharan countries. Likewise, the airfare dummy is highly significant and 
positive for both the entire continent and the Sub-Saharan region. This dependency of the 
African countries on European airlines for transportation is apparently a strong determinant of 
the emigration of skilled Africans to Europe.  
Networks remain a significant magnet to the new host country for entire Africa and the 
sub-regional samples. This actually is very interesting because it indicates a never fading 
emigration. Networks will always exist in the host country, reinforcing the continuity of 
immigration and rendering immigration self-sustained and difficult to brake.  
As expected, GDP per capita in the host country is also a powerful pull factor mainly in 
North Africa. All else equal, brainy Africans in general and northern Africans in particular care 
about a high standard of living and high production in the destination country and they are more 
likely to go where GDP per capita is higher. In this specification of Table 6 we find that PPP in 
the home country matters. It has a negative elasticity of 0.1, revealing that controlling for 
everything else, low standards of living in the home country push brainy Africans away to 
Europe. However, this is not significant in the sub-regions of the continent.  
Our results also show that an increase in government expenditures growth deters the 
emigration of the highly skilled people in North Africa. Once again, an increase in SAPs triggers 
skilled emigration from North Africa to Europe, ceteris paribus. Trampled civil rights as in the 
case of a dictatorship make it more difficult for people to leave the country and go abroad. In 
sum, we find evidence that even thirty years after decolonization, ex-colonial powers play a role 
in attracting skilled immigrants from Africa. Portugal and the United Kingdom are the two most   30
powerful poles of attraction in Europe for Africans. The airfare connections between the 
respective countries in Europe and Africa play a very strong role in the emigration of brainy 
Africans to their countries’ former colonial powers. The existence of networks in the host 
country and high GDP per capita in the host country are all significant determinants of the 
exodus of brainy Africans to these host European countries.  
Lastly, our results also confirm that positive economic development and a strong or 
stable economy – either in the form of a high PPP, or high government expenditures, or no SAPs 
– in the African countries are powerful incentives for the brainy Africans to stay home.   
 
5.  Summary and Concluding Remarks  
It has been widely described in the literature that since the 1960s when Africa acquired its 
independence from European colonialism, it is losing more than 20,000 of its skilled labor force 
to the OECD countries yearly (Adepoju, 2008). It is also known that skilled and educated people 
are more likely to migrate and circulate around countries. They are the most mobile because of 
their demanded skills and because they command higher wages that they allow them the means 
to move easier. Note that depending on the circumstances and on the specific countries and 
occupations, brain drain may not always be detrimental to the origin countries. From this kind of 
migration, the migrants gain because they find better opportunities, jobs and remuneration in the 
destination country. The destination countries also gain when they receive skilled, healthy and 
educated workers, especially now when all developed countries are out to recruit the skilled 
migrants of the world. Some migration experts also argue that African migration will continue in 
big numbers over the next decades.  
It is equally documented in the literature that Europe is the most favored destination of 
Africans. Given the long history that binds these two continents, the numbers certainly make   31
sense. In this paper we study the bilateral migration flow of highly skilled Africans to Fortress 
Europe and specifically to seven European ex-colonial powers. As we test several hypotheses on 
the determinants of the emigration of brainy individuals out of Africa, we endeavor to test in 
particular the colonial related vestiges hypothesis between Africa and Europe. Based on previous 
literature, we contend that European colonialism in Africa – although it officially ended about 
forty years ago – is still a strong magnet between the former colonial power and its former 
colony. Among other hypotheses, we acknowledge the power of networks and the hypothesis 
that people mostly migrate for money and better economic conditions. Due to the severe 
empirical handicap of non-existence of adequate data about Africa, this important subject has not 
been sufficiently analyzed in the empirical economics of migration. 
  This paper presents new estimates of the African brain drain to Europe over the period of 
1990 –2001 based on the bilateral migration dataset by Docquier et al. (2008). Raw statistics 
reveal that colonial ties are still persisting on the continent. We find that while, on average, 
486,500 Algerians emigrated to France only 75 Algerians went to Portugal; while 106,862 
Kenyans went to the United Kingdom, only 442 moved to France; and while 2,627 highly skilled 
migrants from Mozambique went to Portugal none moved to Germany.  
Colonial ties can take several forms. For example, even though colonialism has officially 
ended, the international air traffic system in Africa (mostly in the Sub-Sahara countries) is still 
structured according to the colonial state of affairs. For instance, somebody from Abidjan (Cote 
d’Ivoire) who wants to go to Europe can only land in Paris rather than in Milan. Moreover, 74% 
of the African countries have the same official language as the former colonial power, and 
military bases from the former European colonizers are still on guard in many African countries. 
But colonial ties could also be manifested through a lingering intellectual and cultural affinity, a 
shared political ideology, and even a taste and longing for the former colonizer’s couture, music   32
and food. All these examples that bilaterally link the two countries in Africa and Europe 
respectively are even more pronounced among the highly skilled and educated Africans.  
The regression results show that, indeed, there are certain determinants that can help us 
understand the African brain drain to Europe and to some specific countries in particular. In our 
analysis, we find that both economic reasons and the existence of networks, along with colonial 
ties and language affinities can predict the massive African exodus to Europe over the last 
decade. Evidently, as Africa is a large continent, it pays to sub-divide it into two regions: the 
North and the Sub-Sahara region. It is interesting that there are differences between the two 
regions, whereby Sub-Sahara Africans would rather stay put and North Africans would rather go 
to Europe. 
Specifically, our results show that all variables in the World Systems Theory are even 
more important for the brainy African migration to Fortress Europe. Ceteris paribus, the 
magnitude of the colonialism coefficient (72%) is higher than any other factors explaining the 
brain drain from Africa with a significance level at 1%. At the same time we find that language 
assimilation is a deterrent to emigration. However, when we divide the continent in two sub-
regions (Sub-Sahara and North Africa), we find, that brainy people from Sub-Sahara Africa are 
more likely (72%) to move to a European country if their country of origin shares the same 
official language as their former colonial power. This indicates the degree and footprint of 
assimilation through language that the former colonial powers applied in the Sub-Sahara African 
countries – 81% of these countries have the same language. But emigration is a negative function 
of the colonialism variable for the Sub-Sahara region.  
Among all the European ex-colonizers Portugal exerts a very strong magnetism on the 
emigration of all Africans and of Sub-Sahara Africans, compared to the reference group – the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, is preferred as a destination for   33
brainy Africans over Belgium, Germany, and Italy. Lastly, brainy Africans are indifferent about 
going to France, Spain or the United Kingdom.  
Overall our results confirm that the structure of the international airfare system in Africa 
propels emigration from the ex-colony to the ex-colonial power. The airfare system is a proxy of 
the role of distance according to the gravity model, but also of some remnants of colonialism. 
The existence of networks in the destination country or in the ex-colonial power is a significant 
reason why Africans go to this particular European country. In the migration literature, and 
especially in sociology, it is long known and acknowledged that networks are important drivers 
of migration for all individuals. Here we find that the power of networks also applies to the 
highly skilled, talented and educated individuals.  
The high standards of living in the destination country matter. Those European countries 
(among the ex-colonial powers) with high GDP per capita attract highly skilled Africans, who 
are, naturally, informed about job opportunities and the value of their human capital abroad. This 
applies to Africans from the Northern region. Therefore, brainy Africans do migrate for money. 
Lastly, we also find evidence that SAPs trigger emigration from the North African region, but 
government expenditures and non existing civil liberties deter it.    34
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Table 1: List and Definition of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variable   
Emigration flow  Total number of skilled African emigration over the period of 1990-2001 (in ln) 
Destination is the seven ex-colonial European powers: 
  Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom 
   
Explanatory Variables   
Push-Pull Framework and 
Gravity Model   
Population Host  Population size of the host country at time t 
GDP/Capita Host  GDP at Purchasing Power Parity per capita of the host country at time t 
Airfare System  Existence of a direct flight from an African country’s major city to a city of its 
ex-colonial power and provided by an national airline of the ex-colonizer 
Population in the ex-
colonies 
The total number of inhabitants of the former colonies at time t 
PPP Origin country  The Purchasing Power Parity of the country of origin at time t 
Government Expenditures 
Growth 
The government expenditures growth in the origin country at time t 
SAP  Dummy for Structural Adjustment Programs in the country of origin 
 
World System Approach 
Colonial ties  A dummy variable for being colonized or not 
Belgium  A dummy variable for being colonized by Belgium or not 
Dual Colonial Powers  A dummy variable for being colonized by other countries or not 
France  A dummy variable for being colonized by France or not 
Germany  A dummy variable for being colonized by Germany or not 
Italy  A dummy variable for being colonized by Italy or not 
Independent   A dummy variable for never being colonized  
Portugal  A dummy variable for being colonized by Portugal or not 
Spain  A dummy variable for being colonized by Spain or not 
The United Kingdom  A dummy variable for the reference group 
Language  Dummy if an African country’s first official language is the same as the 
language of its former colonial power 
Networks Approach   
Networks  Stock of foreign population in host country at time t 
   
Socio-Political aspects and 
Political Economy   
Civic Liberties  Degree of freedom and civic rights in the country of origin; Civic Liberties are 
measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of 
freedom and seven the lowest 
   40
Table 2a: Ex-Colonial Powers’ Presence in Africa by Region  
 African  Sub-Regions   
European Ex-Colonial 
Power North  Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Entire  Africa 
0 3  3  Belgium 
0 6.38  5.66 
0 2  2  Dual ex-Colonial Powers 
0 4.26  3.77 
4 16  20  France
a) 
66.67 34.04  37.74 
0 1  1  Germany 
0 2.13  1.89 
1 1  2  Italy 
16.67 2.13 3.77 
0 2  2  Independent
b) 
0 4.26  3.77 
0 5  5  Portugal
c) 
0 10.64  9.43 
0 1  1  Spain 
0 2.13  1.89 
1 16  17  The United Kingdom
d) 
16.67 34.04  32.08 
6 47  53  Total 
100 100  100 
a) France former colonies were: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia 
b) Independent states: Ethiopia and Liberia 
c) Portugal former colonies: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao     
Tome & Principe 
d) British former colonies: Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
Note: For each ex-colonial power, the first row represents the absolute numbers and the 
second row in italic represents the percentage   
Source: Gieler (2007), CIA Factbook, CEPII Data Set; Authors Own Cross-Tabulation   41
Table 2b: Official Language Commonality 
  African Sub-Regions        
Same Language as the 
Ex-Colonial Power 
North Africa  Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
Entire Africa 











































Table 3: Selected Summary Statistics  
   1990 2000 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev. Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Emigrants (in thousand)  5,424.94  32,018.32  7,910.32  39,234.62
Same Language as ex-Colonial Power (%)  0.74  0.441  0.74  0.441 
Direct Airfare to ex-Colonial Power (%)  0.55  0.498  0.55  0.498 
Population Host (in million)  44.300  24.400  45.600  25.000 
Networks (in thousand)  1,588,675  1,351,133  2,161,603  1,658,015
GDP/C Host Country (in thousand)  17  2,751.623  24  3,061.405
PPP Origin Country (in US$)  77.60  99.234  248.07  572.899 
Civil Liberties (scaled from 1 to 7)  4.78  1.326  4.51  1.340 
Structural Adjustment Programs (%)  0.72  0.451  0.72  0.451 
Source: Docquier et al. (2008); Authors Own Calculation 
 
Table 2c: International Airfare System between Africa and Europe 
  African Sub-Regions   
Direct Airfare Flights 
from the ex-Colony to 































100%   42
 
Table 4: Average Migration Flows of Brainy African to Ex-Colonial Powers by Country of Origin 
(1990-2001) 
  Going to a European Ex-Colonial Power 
Country of Origin 
in Africa 
Belgium France Germany  Italy  Portugal Spain  UK 
Algeria 7153.5  486568  6345  6397  75.5  16159  5994 
Angola 727  4910.5  0  389  13164  1348.5  2646 
Benin 182  5194  421.5  322.5  7.5  73.5  143.5 
Botswana 6.5  51.5  0  3.5  2.5  0  735.5 
Burkina Faso  106  1955.5  665.5  1450.5  1  219.5  52 
Burundi 626  545.5  171.5  0  1.5  0  972 
Cameroon 881  15516  2870.5  1231  0  689  1826.5 
Cape  Verde  141.5  8185  0  1873 16970 1252 175.5 
Central African  24.5  3170  54  312.5  1.5  59  183.5 
Chad 67  1228.5  131.5  40  1  0  93.5 
Comoros  8  6608.5  0  5 16 0 40 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  5953  16061.5  4955  893.5  114  381  3989 
Congo, Rep. of  the  1866.5  17136  434.5  1029  145.5  468  1544.5 
Cote d'Ivoire  357.5  16389  904  3816.5  33.5  176  1496.5 
Djibouti 24  800.5  0  37  0  0  106.5 
Egypt 842  14559.5  6212.5  14255.5  42  1346.5  19775.5 
Equatorial Guinea  6.5  61.5  0  24  11  6945.5  30.5 
Eritrea 0  49  0  2930.5  1  0  3709 
Ethiopia 230.5  1289.5  8637.5  2206.5  3.5  102.5  4410 
Gabon 95.5  2469  94.5  108  3  0  60.5 
Gambia, The  59  666.5  1163  186  8.5  3441.5  2069.5 
Ghana 1175.5  2936.5  10860.5  11572  20.5  1607.5  36587 
Guinea 285  4727  707.5  341.5  425  3166.5  155 
Guinea-Bissau 29  2520.5  0  94.5  5995  1490.5  210 
Kenya  233 442  1567.5  958.5 51 220.5  106862 
Lesotho 2  7  47  4  0  0  320 
Liberia 110.5  327.5  1092.5  95.5  12.5  482.5  880 
Libya 143  748  1049  1131.5  5  308  5812.5 
Madagascar 276  18019  261.5  269  17  0  511.5 
Malawi 20  32  33.5  6.5  26.5  0  9014 
Mali 116  27121.5  368.5  161.5  22  1678  76.5 
Mauritania 99  5465.5  0  325  7.5  2237.5  21.5 
Mauritius 619.5  22069.5  0  3665  5.5  0  21891 
Morocco 45987  376236  39045  85374  306  164003.5  8826.5 
Mozambique 140.5  508.5  0  70  2627  484  2110.5 
Namibia 10  47  0  1.5  9  0  561.5 
Niger 89  891.5  259.5  262.5  0  0  53 
Nigeria 658.5  1343.5  6595.5  9564  55.5  4111.5  50677.5 
Rwanda 1061.5  736  311  148.5  10.5  0  898.5 
Sao Tome and Principe  8  55  0  15  3235.5  0  63.5 
Senegal 528  37725  1136.5  21092  241.5  6677  424 
Seychelles  13 254.5  0  1037 0.5  0 2296.5 
Sierra Leone  138.5  306  2118.5  266  16.5  556.5  8580.5 
Somalia 133  395.5  3602.5  2393.5  2  132.5  16084.5 
South Africa  562  1113  2202.5  175.5  461.5  733.5  65561   43
Table 4: Average Migration Flows of Brainy African to Ex-Colonial Powers by Country of Origin 
(1990-2001) 
  Going to a European Ex-Colonial Power 
Country of Origin 
in Africa 
Belgium France Germany  Italy  Portugal Spain  UK 
Sudan  86.5  547.5  1585.5  291.5 7 146.5  4765 
Swaziland 12  2  0  1.5  4.5  0  316 
Tanzania 138  318  448  0  65  0  27894.5 
Togo 279.5  7038.5  3405  438.5  12.5  0  329.5 
Tunisia 2565.5  182753  13062  25416  21  628  2354 
Uganda 103  237  591  125.5  17  0  46102.5 
Zambia 67  161.5  165  61.5  10.5  0  12817.5 
Zimbabwe 87.5  148.5  0  36.5  78.5  0  24619 
Total 75,134  1,298,649  123,575.5  202,905.5 44,371.5  221,325.5 507,730 
Note: The World Development Indicator (2006) classifies the African Countries into two main categories: Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and North Africa. The countries that belong to the latter category are: Algeria, Djibouti
13, 
Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The others belong to Sub-Saharan Africa. 















                                                 
13 Even though Djibouti is the Horn of Africa, it’s not classified in the World Development Indicator as part of Sub-
Saharan Region in Africa. We therefore classified it among the Northern Countries.   44
Table 5: Robust Coefficient OLS Estimates with one Colonization Dummy Variable
a 
Variables  Entire Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa  North Africa 


















































































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Robust Coefficient OLS Estimates with Separate Colonization Dummy 
Variables for Each Ex-Colonial Power
a 
Variables  Entire Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa  North Africa 








































(0.150)   


























Spain  0.476 
(0.968) 
0.413 
(0.980)   





(0.217)   
Airfare Dummy  0.496*** 
(0.108) 
0.768*** 
(0.119)   




























Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a The UK is the Reference Category 
   




Table A1: Emigration Flows of Brainy Africans to Ex-Colonial Powers by Selected Country of Origin 
in Absolute Numbers (1990-2001) 
  Country of Destination: a European ex-Colonial Power 
Country of 















Algeria   5,939 
a)  460,358  3,758 4,683  40  10,238  2,820 
 8,368 
b)  512,778  8,932 8,111  111 22,080  9,168 
Kenya    135 352 622 702  46  141  93,800 
 331  532  2,513  1,215  56  300  119,924 
Mali   101  23,254  292 118  6 1,056 50 
 131  30,989  445 205  38 2,300  103 
Mozambique 81  336 0 51  1,676  308 1,367 
 200  681  0  89  3,578  660 2,854 
Note: 
a) The number in this column represents the total migrants from Algeria in Belgium in 1991  
          
b) The total number of migrants from Algeria in Belgium in 2001; the same for the others following countries 
Source: Docquier et al. (2008); Authors Own Calculation 